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Abstract: Insurgents’ activities and government’s counter-insurgency operations have claimed hundreds 
of lives and destroyed many human habitations and sources of livelihoods across Nigeria. Essentially, the 
rising wave of insurgency has overwhelmed the internal security capacity of the police and has 
consequently increased the involvement of the military in internal security operations. Over the years 
various Joint Military Task Forces (JTFs) have been established and mandated to carry out counter-
insurgency operations across the country. Insurgents’ activities and counter-insurgency operations of the 
various JTFs have destroyed entire communities and killed hundreds of Nigerians including innocent 
civilians. The essay examines the human rights implications of government’s counter-insurgency 
initiatives in Nigeria, and concludes that the operations of the JTFs have actually protracted the spate of 
violence against the civilian populations they are meant to protect. The essay proposes that the 
desirability of a counter-insurgency strategy should be determined by its capacity to protected civilians 
from human rights abuses and violent attacks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been an upsurge in insurgent activities in Nigeria since 1999 when the 
country returned to democratic governance. The police which are the primary institution 
responsible for law enforcement and internal security have been overwhelmed by the 
rising waves of insurgency, and this has resulted in an increasing internal security role 
for the military. Apparently, government has come to rely on incessant deployment of 
military-dominated Joint Task Forces (JTFs) to perform internal security duties across 
the country. Over the years various joint military and security task forces have been 
established and mandated to perform counter-insurgency operations across the country. 
The Army, Navy, Air Force and paramilitary Police are regularly deployed for internal 
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security roles. But regrettably, the military often respond to insurgent activities 
primarily with a brutal show of force that often results in high civilian casualties. To 
recall, in November 1999, barely six months after the transition to democracy, hundreds 
of civilians were killed when a detachment of the Army bombarded Odi community in 
the Niger Delta, in an apparent retaliation for the death of about six policemen who 
were killed in a clash with local insurgents (Human Rights Watch 1999, p.14).  
 
In October 2011, two years after the Odi incident, a detachment of the Nigerian 
Army once again invaded Zaki Biam in North-Central Nigeria and executed many 
unarmed civilians in reprisal for the killing of 19 soldiers who were earlier sent there to 
restore peace following ethnic violence (see Human Rights Watch, 2002). Since then, 
misdirected retaliatory assaults against civilian populations have destroyed entire 
communities and killed hundreds of Nigerians. This essay argues that the 
disproportionate use of force by JTFs in combating insurgency has protracted and 
exacerbated the level of violence against civilian populations of host communities. The 
essay therefore analyses key JTFs’ counter-insurgency operations and examines their 
human rights impacts on the civilian population in Nigeria. Firstly, the essay explores 
the nature of insurgency in Nigeria. Secondly, it evaluates the JTFs approach to counter-
insurgency. Thirdly, it analyses international humanitarian law provision for human 
rights protection while countering insurgency. Fourthly, it examines the human rights 
implications of JTFs operations in Nigeria. Fifthly, the essay critically examines the 
human rights impacts of the ‘Civilian JTF’ counter-insurgency operations in north 
eastern Nigeria. Sixthly, the essay proposes some policy options for mitigating the 
security and human rights impacts of JTFs counter-insurgency operations. The final 
section concludes the essay.  
 
II. INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA 
 
The rising wave of insurgency has assumed a crisis dimension in Nigeria –
resource-based and sectarian insurgency have claimed many lives, destroyed sources of 
livelihood, and created a climate of perpetual fear and insecurity across the country. In 
the Niger Delta, resource-based insurgency has intensified since the 1990s when series 
of protests by environmental activists and resource control agitators were violently 
repressed by security forces. These cycles of protests started in December 1998 when a 
group of youth activists in the Niger Delta held a conference to strategise for the 
survival of their ethnic nationality. From the conference which was held in the town of 
Kaiama in Bayelsa state, the participants, who were mainly ethnic Ijaw, came up with 
the ‘Kaiama Declaration’ in which they affirmed their right over natural resource 
control and land ownership. The Federal Government perceived this as a threat to its 
authority and responded with considerable force through the military, resulting in 
violent confrontations between youth activists and security forces. In the ensuing 
confrontations, numerous youth activist movements emerged and later transformed into 
ethnic militia organisations (Forest 2012, p.47).
 
Between late 2005 and early 2006, 
leaders of several militia groups in the region came together and formed a number of 
umbrella resistance organisations in an attempt to combine their efforts to more 
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effectively match the capabilities of the security forces, especially the Nigerian Army 
(Forest 2012, p.48). 
 
 
Notable among these umbrella militant groups were the Niger Delta People’s 
Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, and the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) whose operations was coordinated by its 
spokesperson who goes by the stage name, ‘Jomo Gbomo’. The emergence of these 
umbrella militia organisations resulted in an armed resistance which later degenerated 
into hostage taking, bombing of oil facilities and kidnapping for ransoms (Chiluwa 
2011, p.197-208). As usual, Government responded with massive deployment of special 
military and security task forces in the region. Attempts by security forces to curtail 
militant activities however led to increased violent clashes between government forces 
and militant groups (Malina, n.d.).  
 
The continuous deployment of special military forces and regular violent clashes 
between these security forces and armed insurgents eventually militarised the Niger 
Delta región –insurgents responded with large scale violence through the accumulation 
and use of sophisticated weapons with which they engaged security forces in bloody 
clashes that often results in many cases of human rights violations and high civilian 
casualties. However, the rate of human rights violations resulting from insurgency and 
counter-insurgency operations in the Niger Delta has subsided since October 2009 
(Malina, n.d.), when the Federal Government launched the Presidential Amnesty 
Programme for ex-insurgents. 
 
While insurgents’ activities have relatively subsided in the Niger Delta, there is 
an ongoing sectarian insurgency in parts of northern Nigeria, especially in the North-
East, where escalation in violent confrontations between security forces and sectarian 
insurgents have resulted in high civilian fatalities and the destruction of many human 
habitations and livelihoods. Specifically, violent confrontations between state security 
forces and the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihadl group, also known as 
Boko Haram, have increased since 2009 with high civilian casualties and many 
incidences of human rights abuses. Although Boko Haram emerged around 2002, 
violent confrontations between the group and security forces began in June 2009 when 
an encounter between members of the sect and a joint police and military unit known as 
‘Operation Flush’ over the enforcement of a government law that requires the 
mandatory use of helmets by all motorcyclists, turned violent. During the confrontation, 
about 17 members of sect were shot and injured by security operatives (Forest 2012, 
p.63). Angered by what they considered as police brutality against its members, the sect 
resorted to sporadic violent attacks against the police and other Government institutions 
across the north-eastern states of Nigeria. Subsequent clashes between members of the 
sect and security forces left more than 800 people dead, including the extra-judicial 
execution of the leader of the sect, Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 (Forest 2012, p.64). 
The extra-judicial killing of its leader marked a turning point in the radicalisation of the 
leadership and operations of the group; after a short period of inactivity following the 
death of its leader, members of the sect regrouped under a more radical leader, 
Abubakar Shekau, who was formerly Mohammed Yusuf’s deputy. Since then, the sect 
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has carried out more violent attacks, including targeted killings and suicide bombings 
across the North-East and North-Central parts of the country (see IRIN News, 2013), 
causing Government to deploy joint military and security task forces to the affected 
States.  
 
III. JOINT MILITARY TASK FORCES AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA 
 
The police which are the primary institution responsible for internal security in 
Nigeria have been overwhelmed by the rising wave of insurgency largely because they 
lack requisite training and expertise in counter-insurgency operations (Francis et al. 
2011, p.110). Consequently, government have relied on the military which are widely 
perceived to be better trained and equipped to take a leading role in law enforcement 
and counter-insurgency operations. Over the years various task forces including Special 
Task Forces (STFs), Military Special Operations Forces (MISOFs), Joint Security Task 
Forces (JSTFs) and Joint Military Task Forces (JMTFs) have been established and 
mandated to carry out counter-insurgency operations in different parts of the country. 
Although a typical Joint Task Force (JTF) in Nigeria comprises the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, Police, State Security Services (SSS) and sometimes immigration and custom 
officials (Francis et al. 2011, p.109), they are mostly dominated by the Army.  
 
The first military task force established for internal security operation in 
contemporary Nigeria dates back to 1993 when an Internal Security Task Force (ISTF) 
was deployed in Ogoni land in the Niger Delta to suppress protests by oil producing 
communities against Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) over 
environmental injustice (Boele et al, 2001). The operations of the ISTF were 
characterised by extra-judicial executions and widespread human rights abuses, 
including the widely condemned arrest and eventual execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
eight other members of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 
1995 (Forest 2012, p.25). The execution of Saro-Wiwa and other eight members of 
MOSOP (a.k.a. Ogoni Nine) by the then military junta of General Sani Abacha, was 
widely condemned by members of the international community and human rights 
organisations, including Amnesty International (Boele et al, 2001, p.80-81).  
 
In addition to the ISTF, two JTFs code named ‘Operation Salvage’ and 
‘Operation Flush I, II and III’ in Bayelsa and Rivers states respectively, were 
established in 1997 (Francis et al. 2011, p.32). However, the first major JMTF in the 
Niger Delta was established in 1999 and code named ‘Operation HAKURI II’. 
Basically, ‘Operation HAKURI II’ was a punitive military operation that resulted in 
massive destruction of lives and property after two days of continuous bombardment of 
Odi community in the Niger Delta (see Human Rights Watch 1999). At the height of the 
now-abated Niger Delta insurgency, the JTF code named ‘Operation Pulo Shield’ 
(formerly ‘Operation Restore Hope’) was established in around 2004 under the 
command of a Major General, with the mandate of countering insurgency, illegal oil 
bunkering, piracy, kidnapping and hostage taking in the creeks and coastal areas of the 
Niger Delta and other adjoining states (Azuatalam, 2012). The activities of ‘Operation 
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Pulo Shield’ are usually fraught with allegations of arbitrary killings and human rights 
abuses against the host communities.  
 
Apart from the Niger Delta region, a number of JTFs have been established in 
parts of northern Nigeria as a result of the increasing incidents of ethnic and sectarian 
violence in the region. Since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic governance, the 
North-Central part of the country has witnessed ethnic and sectarian violence, mainly 
involving Christians and Muslim adherents, particularly on the Jos Plateau and in 
Kaduna state. In response to the breakdown of law and order that resulted from Muslim-
Christian strife on the Jos Plateau, a Security Task Force (STF) code named ‘Operation 
Safe Haven’ was established sometime in 2010. The STF was commanded by a Major 
General and its operatives includes personnel from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Mobile 
Police (MOPOL), Anti-terrorism Squad (ATS) from the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), 
and   other personnel drawn from the SSS and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence 
Corps (NSCDC). The STF was mandated to curtail the spate of killings by ethnic 
militiamen on the Jos Plateau and its environs. In addition, with the emergence of Boko 
Haram insurgency, a JTF code named ‘Operation Restore Order’ was established in 
June 2011, and deployed in Borno and Yobe states. Specifically, the mandate of 
‘Operation Restore Order’ is to “restore order to the north-eastern part of the country 
with emphasis on Maiduguri” (Mohammed 2012, p.28). The JTF whose counter-
insurgency operations were initially limited to Borno and Yobe states had its mandate 
extended in September 2011 to include a range of states where Boko Haram insurgents 
are known to be active, excluding Plateau state which falls within the operational 
domain of the STF.  
 
IV. COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 
Human rights are those universally recognised values and freedoms, and the 
legal guarantees that safeguard individuals and groups against the actions and inactions 
of the State, agents of the State or other individuals that interfere with their natural 
entitlements and human dignity. As universally recognised values, the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are usually included as essential provisions of 
international law, especially human rights law and international humanitarian law, and 
these are reflected in major international human rights treaties notably, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1949). As essential component of international law, 
human rights provisions are usually reflected in treaty obligations of States. 
Accordingly, the security of the individual is universally regarded a basic human right, 
and the protection of the individual against human rights violation is accepted as a 
fundamental obligation of every State. Consequently, human rights law obliges States to 
take certain actions to respect, safeguard and guarantee human rights of citizens. 
 
Human rights law and international humanitarian law require States to promote 
and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering insurgency (UN, 
2013). Any counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism strategy adopted by States must 
therefore comply with the provisions of international human rights law and 
humanitarian law. In this regard, counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism strategy is any 
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measure adopted by States to prevent, pre-empt, counter and respond to insurgency and 
terrorism. Though counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency differs in certain aspect, 
they generally include any step taken to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately, defeat 
insurgents and terrorist organisations (Rineheart, 2010). It is the right and duty of every 
State to take effective counter-insurgency measures to ensure public security. By their 
nature however, most counter-insurgency operations are characterised by violence and 
violation of the human rights of the civilian population. Hence, as part of global efforts 
to mitigate incidents of human rights abuses associated with counter-insurgency 
operations, the international community has taken certain measures to ensure that any 
strategy adopted by states to counter insurgency and terrorism complies with their treaty 
obligation under international law (see UN, 2006; Melzer, 2009).  
 
Human rights law and International humanitarian law oblige States to be 
accountable for human rights violations committed by their security forces while 
combating insurgency and terrorism. In this regard, a global counter-terrorism strategy 
was adopted by the United Nations’ General Assembly in Resolution 60/288 of 2006, in 
which certain steps were taken to ensure that all counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency measures complies with international humanitarian law. The global counter-
terrorism strategy considers human rights protection and effective counter-terrorism 
measures as “complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives which must be 
pursued together as part of States’ duty to protect individuals within their jurisdiction” 
(UN, 2008, p.19). Hence, in his report to the 66
th
 Session of the General Assembly on 
‘Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights’, the UN Special Rapporteur on the protection 
of human rights in the fight against terrorism, Ben Emmerson, stated that;   
 
It is essential that the protection of human rights of victims of terrorism is seen 
as a genuine legal duty resting primarily on States, and that it is not misused as a pretext 
for violating the human rights of those suspected of terrorism, for taking emergency 
measures which provides for excessive and disproportionate executive powers, or for 
other essentially political objectives (UN, 2011).  
 
Moreover, as part of measures to protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while combating terrorism and insurgency, States are obliged by international 
humanitarian and human rights laws to strictly adhere to the “principles of distinction, 
proportionality and precaution” (UN, 2013, p.62), particularly in counter-insurgency 
operations against irregular armed groups that blend with civilian population. Thus, the 
protection of victims’ right is an integral part of the war against terror, and by extension 
human rights law and international humanitarian law oblige States as part of their treaty 
obligation, to protect human rights while countering terrorism and insurgency.  
 
V. THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF JTFS OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA 
 
Ideally, JTFs operations are intended to protect civilians from violence, and their 
presence often creates the expectation among host communities that they will be 
protected from violence and human rights abuses. However, internal security operations 
of JTFs have became notorious for bombing insurgents in civilian populated areas 
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thereby killing innocent people and destroying human habitations and sources of 
livelihood (Lawan, 2013; Amnesty International, 2012). The brutal nature of JTFs 
operations was aptly demonstrated in the 20 November 1999 bombardment of Odi 
community in Bayelsa state by operatives of ‘Operation HAKURI II’. To recall, after 
two days of intense bombardment with heavy artillery, aircraft, grenade launchers, 
mortar bombs and other sophisticated and deadly weapons, about 2,483 persons mainly 
women and children were killed and numerous buildings destroyed (Courson 2006, 
p.3).  
 
The atrocious spectacle of Odi was replayed on 22 and 24 October 2001, when a 
detachment of the Nigerian Army invaded Zaki Biam and neighbouring communities in 
North-Central Nigeria, in a reprisal attack that resulted in the extra-judicial executions 
of many unarmed civilians and the destruction of numerous property (see Human Rights 
Watch, 2002). The killings in Odi and Zaki Biam are clearly arbitrary and thus a 
violation of the human rights of the inhabitants of those communities, because those 
were killed were neither insurgents nor organised armed groups. Organised armed 
groups, according to the ‘Interpretive Guidance’ of the International Committee of The 
Red Cross (ICRC), are those that recruit their members mainly from the civilian 
population and possess the capacity and military organisation to either ‘take a direct part 
in hostilities’ or conduct hostilities ‘on behalf of a party to the conflict’ (Melzer, 2009, 
p.69-72). These attacks were generally condemned as a violation of human rights law 
and international humanitarian law (Human Rights Watch, 1999; 2002).
 
 
In spite of the general condemnation that however followed the Odi and Zaki 
Biam military bombardments, operatives of the JTFs have continue to use lethal force 
against civilians even when it is necessary to protect lives. For example, in May 2009 
the JTF code named ‘Operation Restore Hope’ destroyed seven communities suspected 
of harbouring militant camps in Delta state. Subsequent hostilities between MEND and 
men of ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in Gbaramatu kingdom in Delta state claimed more 
than 500 lives and displaced about 5,000 people (Francis et al. 2011, p.200). This 
particular operation was very atrocious because it was a coordinated land, water and 
aerial bombardment, involving a combine force of the Army, Air Force and Navy 
personnel. The bombardment which lasted for two weeks –from 13 to 27 May 2009– 
caused the violent death of many people, mostly women, children and the aged, and 
endangered the lives of many others who were forced out of their communities into 
forests and swamps (Francis et al, 2011). Ironically, the use of excessive force by 
operatives of ‘Operation Restore Hope’ actually intensified the level of organised 
violence in the Niger Delta as it triggered a cycle of attacks and counter-attacks that 
eventually resulted in high civilian fatalities (Chiluwa, 2011).  
 
Up till now, human rights violation by JTF operatives continues unabated across 
the country. To recall, in April 2013 about 185 civilians were killed by operatives of the 
Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in Baga village, Borno state, during a bloody 
clash between Boko Haram insurgents and operatives of the task force (Wisdom 
Patrick, 2012). The military operation which decimated almost the whole village, was 
widely condemned by members of the international community including the United 
AFENO SUPER ODOMOVO 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 3 (December 2014) pp. 46-62  ISSN: 2340-9592 
53 
 
Nations’ Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, who said he was “shocked and saddened” by 
the arbitrary killing of civilians in Baga (UN News, 2013). Though the leadership of the 
task force claimed that those killed were either Boko Haram members or those 
associated with the sect, and thus regard such operations as an accomplished mission, 
the operation violated the principle of ‘targeting intelligence’ (UN, 2013). In an 
asymmetrical conflict such as this accurate ‘targeting intelligence’ is necessary to 
distinguish insurgents from neutral civilians. Besides, the operation did not adhere to 
the principles of ‘proportionality and precaution’ (UN, 2013), thereby resulting in high 
civilian fatalities.  
 
More tellingly, while commenting on a joint military task force operation in 
which over 200 suspected insurgents were killed in Giwa Barracks, when Boko Haram 
insurgents attempted to release their colleagues from a military detention centre in 14 
March 2014 (BBC News, 2014), the Director of Defence Information, Major General 
Chris Olukolade, stated that “the attack has been successfully repelled with heavy 
human casualties on the terrorists” (Mamah et al, 2014). It thus appears the JTFs 
measure their success by the number of insurgents they kill –they give regular accounts 
of scores of insurgents killed almost on a daily basis (Monguno, 2013). It is worthy to 
note that both the attackers and the detainees were killed, so even if the attackers were 
assumed to be insurgents, it is very likely that some of the detainees were innocent 
civilians because the military authority later admitted that over 1,400 suspected 
insurgents were detained for many months without trial (Mutum, 2013). While it is 
admitted that it is not easy to distinguish between insurgents and neutral civilians in an 
irregular conflict involving elusive insurgent group whose members easily blend with 
the civilian population, these killings are nonetheless, a clear violation of the “principles 
of distinction, proportionality and precaution” in asymmetrical conflict (UN, 2013).   
 
Over the years, the undisciplined and brutal nature of JTFs counter-insurgency 
operations have resulted in hundreds of extra-judicial killings, forced disappearance and 
burning of houses, especially in the north-eastern part of Nigeria (see Amnesty 
International, 2009; 2011). Instances abounds where insurgents’ attacks on security 
forces are revenged on innocent civilians. For example, on 9 July 2009, after some 
persons suspected to be Boko Haram insurgents allegedly attacked an army patrol van 
in Borno state and injured two soldiers in the process, it was reported by local residents 
that operatives of the JTF began shooting sporadically and breaking into houses, 
singling out male occupants and shooting them and driving women out of their houses 
which they later set ablaze (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network 
[IRIN] News 2011).  
 
Also in its report “Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence” Amnesty 
International documented series of human rights abuses committed by operatives of the 
JTFs who habitually use disproportionate force against civilians even when there are no 
imminent threats (Amnesty International, 2012). This development was aptly reflected 
in the killing of five people on 9 March 2012, when operatives of JTF opened fire on 
innocent civilians at the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) petrol 
station in Kano state (see Amnesty International, 2012). Evidently, intimidation, 
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harassment and extra-judicial killing of civilians by operatives of JTFs have undermined 
peoples’ fundamental human rights and freedoms, destabilised communal and familial 
ties and displaced many people.  
 
The United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) was alarmed by the high number 
of refugees and internally displaced persons as a result of upsurge in violent attacks in 
North-East Nigeria. Adrian Edwards, spokesperson for the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), stated that refugees and internally displaced 
persons from Nigeria have reported cases of extreme violence against them. According 
to him, “There is mention of people being caught in fighting between insurgents and 
armed forces, arbitrary arrests under the suspicion of belonging to insurgent groups, and 
other serious alleged crimes including, reportedly, summary execution” (UN, 2014). 
This shows that civilians are often trapped in the cycle of ‘retaliatory violence’ 
perpetrated by JTFs and insurgents, and their human rights and freedoms are violated by 
both the insurgents and operatives of the JTF. 
 
Apparently, frequent lethal attacks by Boko Haram insurgents and the worsening 
state of national security which resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency in the 
north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, have given the military-dominated 
JTF the discretion to perpetrate human rights abuses in the affected states. As a report 
by the Associated Press (AP) indicated, within the first six months after the declaration 
of a state of emergency in 2013, a total of 3, 335 corpses were deposited by the 
operatives of the JTF in just one hospital –Sani Abacha Specialist Teaching Hospital in 
Maiduguri, Borno state (see Lawan 2013). According to the AP report, “the number of 
detainees who died in military custody more than tripled” in June, just a month after a 
State of Emergency was declared on 14 May 2013. Moreover, over 950 people 
suspected to be members of or associated with the Boko Haram sect were reported to 
have died in detention facilities operated by the JTFs in the north-eastern cities of 
Maiduguri and Damaturu, in Borno and Yobe states respectively (Amnesty 
International, 2013). According to Amnesty International, most of the detainees died 
because of the deplorable nature of the detention facilities where they were kept –the 
detention facilities were mostly overcrowded and there were reported cases of torture 
and denial of access to medical treatments and lawyers.  
 
It was further reported that detainees died on a daily basis from starvation, 
injuries from beating and suffocation from over-crowding (Amnesty International 
2013). Besides, there were reported cases of summary executions and enforced 
disappearance of suspected insurgents (Amnesty International 2012). In a recent 
incident, 10 civilian squatters in an uncompleted building in Apo legislative quarters in 
the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja were killed by security forces on the 
allegation that they were terrorists (Nwabughiogu 2013). Not surprisingly, the cycles of 
human rights abuses and retaliatory executions of civilians have led to resentment of 
JTFs operations by the host communities including members of the general public. As a 
case in point, on 12 July 2011, members of the Bornu Elders Forum called for the 
withdrawal of JTF troops from the city, arguing that the task force has worsened the 
security situation in the state (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network 
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[IRIN] News 2011). Perhaps, the advent of the armed volunteer Borno Youth Vigilante 
Group popularly known as Civilian JTF, which is currently assisting the official JTF in 
the fight against Boko Haram insurgents, is an attempt by local communities to curb the 
excesses of the official JTFs counter-insurgency operations.  
 
VI. THE CIVILIAN JTF, COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
Since the declaration of a State of Emergency in the North-Eastern states of 
Adamawa, Borno and Yobe on 14 May 2013, the violent conflict in Maiduguri, the 
Borno state capital has taken a different dimension. Bands of youths brandishing 
dangerous weapons such as cutlasses, knives, swords, sticks, axe, cudgels, bows and 
arrows, have appeared on the street of Maiduguri, the state capital (Olugbode, 2013). 
These are members of the Borno Youth Vigilante Group who have emerged to assist the 
official JTF deployed to curb the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in the state. The 
youth vigilante group is popularly known as Civilian JTF because the group has the 
implicit endorsement of the official JTF, who allow them to mount road blocks to help 
fish out alleged Boko Haram insurgents in their neighbourhood (Kawu, 2013). These 
youths are largely motivated by the understanding that they know the insurgents in their 
midst, and they decide to collaborate with the official JTF by ‘trailing, capturing and 
handing over’ known or suspected insurgents to the relevant security agencies (Hamza 
and Sawab, 2013).  
 
The local vigilante group often receive government support and have conducted 
numerous attacks against suspected Boko Haram insurgents (Olugbode, 2013). 
Apparently, they have been useful to the military by supporting their counter-
insurgency operations. In the process of supporting the JTF’s counter-insurgency 
operations, some of the youths have lost their lives. On several occasions some of the 
youths have been ambushed and killed by Boko Haram insurgents. For example, in July 
2013, members of the Civilian JTF invaded the villages of Mainok and Dawashi in 
Maiduguri in search of insurgents. Following the invasion Boko Haram insurgents 
killed about 43 members of the vigilante group in a fierce retaliatory attack (Stratfor, 
2013; see also Nigeria Watch Database). As a result of this development, the youths 
have decided to arm themselves with sophisticated weapons.  
 
While the youths’ collaboration with the JTF has so far been helpful in the fight 
against Boko Haram insurgency, the vigilante group sometimes takes the law into their 
hands by harassing and arresting suspected insurgents including innocent civilians. As 
part of their efforts in fishing out Boko Haram insurgents, these youths often dispense 
justice to their victims in a jungle manner – they have extra-judicially killed many 
suspected Boko Haram insurgents and raided communities and villages suspected of 
harbouring members of the sect (Mamah, 2013). The situation is compounded by the 
absence of direct Government control over the vigilante group which has apparently 
given them the privilege to take the law into their hands by getting involved in various 
acts of human rights abuses, including harassment, extortion and extra-judicial killing of 
suspected insurgents in their neighbourhood.  
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Human rights abuses by the youth vigilante group has become so endemic that 
on 13 July 2013, the Nigeria-based Human Rights Monitor (HRM) raised the alarm 
over the illegal activities of these youths who were alleged to have set ablaze the house 
of the Chairman of the defunct All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) in Borno state, 
Alhaji Othman, for his alleged closeness to some members of the Boko Haram sect 
(Mamah, 2013).  According to HRM, the youth vigilante group have maimed and killed 
many people suspected to be members or financiers of Boko Haram insurgents in Borno 
and Yobe states (Mamah, 2013). As a result of the increasing incidences of extra-
judicial killings perpetrated by the civilian JTF, there is the public apprehension that the 
activities of these youths may degenerate into a level of lawlessness (see Olugbode, 
2013) that could endanger the security and human rights of citizens in their 
neighbourhoods and communities.  
 
VII. THE WAY OUT 
 
The counter-insurgency strategy of deploying large number of military forces is 
an approach that former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell noted, “Could do 
more harm than good” in the fight against insurgency (Campbell, as cited in Forest 
2012, p.93). Heavy deployment of troops has caused individuals and communities in 
and around the theatre of such operations security anxieties and has resulted in the 
violation of their fundamental human rights. Therefore, in order for Government to 
more effectively combat the menace of insurgency with the aid of special joint military 
task forces with minimal negative impacts on human rights, such operations should be 
organised and executed in a manner that reduce ‘collateral damage’ to the barest 
minimum, and safeguard the security and human rights of the host civilian population. 
In this regard, operatives of joint task forces must be charged to strictly adhere to clearly 
defined ‘rules of engagement’ and avoid any excessive use of force that may amount to 
violation of human rights.  
 
Although combating insurgency is typically a police function, whenever it 
becomes necessary for military forces to supplement police efforts, their operations 
must reflect the low intensity nature of their internal security roles. Whenever the 
military is deployed as part of its commitments in protecting civilian citizens from 
violence and danger, whether to suppress an armed revolt or enforce an emergency 
order, it must be subjected to rigorous controls and adhere to clearly defined rules of 
engagement (see Blair, n.d.). Their rules of engagement must explicitly state when it is 
necessary to use force and the control of the use of force during internal security 
operations.  
 
Security forces in Nigeria are apparently out of control in the fight against 
insurgency and terrorism –the internal security operations of the military-dominated 
JTFs are fraught with human rights abuses and extra-judicial execution of civilians 
across the country. However, the mass killing of people suspected to be affiliated with 
insurgents does not, in itself, guarantee the elimination of insurgency. In this regard, for 
the military or any counter-insurgency security task force, to carry out its operations 
with ‘minimal collateral damage’ and protect human rights, it must engage the 
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insurgents on a regular or symmetrical level while leveraging on its technological 
advantage; collect targeting intelligence on the insurgents; ‘recruit and train indigenous 
forces’ to combat the insurgents; and devise a counter-insurgency strategy that 
differentiates between insurgents and neutral civilian population (see Stratfor, 2014). 
According to Stratfor, in order for a ‘counter-insurgency force’ to separate insurgents 
from the neutral population, and gain access to important local intelligence, the 
‘counter-insurgency team’ ‘needs cultural and political guidance’ (Stratfor, 2014). This 
local assistance however requires a friendly relationship between the local communities 
and security forces. 
 
So far, the internal security operations of JTFs have not fostered healthy 
relationships between security forces and the local communities they are apparently 
deployed to protect. To date, one of the biggest obstacles to effective counter-
insurgency operations in Nigeria is the lack of trust and cooperation from local 
communities. Notwithstanding the support of the Civilian JTF in Borno state, the 
relationship between JTF and the host communities is still acrimonious because the 
youth vigilantes sometimes collaborate with the official JTF in perpetrating human 
rights abuses against the civilian population. Regrettably, the acrimonious relationship 
between host communities and security forces makes it difficult to gather important 
security intelligence in support of government counter-insurgency efforts, and 
consequently makes it easy for insurgents to win the support and sympathy of local 
communities that dislike JTF tactics.  
 
Indeed, the current military offensive of JTFs is counter-productive; an 
appropriate counter-insurgency strategy will have to be defensive in nature, based on a 
minimum force approach involving a combination of special paramilitary forces, law 
enforcement agencies, and the weakening of local support for insurgent groups through 
collaborative intelligence gathering. In this regard, JTFs must strive to win the ‘hearts 
and minds’ of the local civilian population by ensuring their security and safety during 
counter-insurgency operations. This should be the way out of the current security and 
human rights situation because, if indeed JTFs operations are intended to achieve 
internal security then their effectiveness should be assessed based on the number of 
vulnerable citizens they are able to protect from violent attacks and human rights 
abuses. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has discovered that upsurge in armed insurgency has resulted in 
massive deployment of JTFs for internal security operations across Nigeria. However, 
these extraordinary measures, supposedly designed to achieve public security, have 
actually exacerbated the level of insecurity across the country. The counter-insurgency 
operations of the military-dominated JTFs are characterised by brutal show of force that 
triggers retaliatory violence from insurgents. The brutal nature of JTFs counter-
insurgency operations has exacerbated the level of violence perpetrated against civilians 
–civilians are often trapped in the cycle of retaliatory violence perpetrated by both the 
JTFs and insurgents.  
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Civilians trapped in the theatre of violence, especially in the north-eastern part 
of Nigeria have fallen victims to violent attacks by both security forces and insurgents –
attacked by security forces for allegedly harbouring insurgents, and killed by insurgents 
for assisting security forces with information that often leads to the arrest of their 
members. The host communities have thus become the common target of both the JTFs 
and the insurgents who carry out retaliatory attacks on civilian at the slightest suspicion 
of giving assistance to their adversary. Violent confrontations between operatives of 
JTFs and insurgents have therefore resulted in a cycle of human rights abuses, extra-
judicial executions, forced disappearance of civilians and wanton destruction of human 
habitations and sources of livelihood.  
 
In summary, beyond the display of lack of capacity to combat the threat of 
insurgency, the State through the instrumentality of the military and other security 
forces have, on several occasions, arbitrarily killed many civilians and destroyed entire 
communities –the punitive bombardment of communities like Odi in Bayelsa, Zaki 
Biam in Benue, Gbaramatu in Delta, and Baga in Borno, are symptomatic of a State 
killing its own citizens in the name of national security. It is thus a human rights tragedy 
that security forces that are mandated by law to protect lives and property, and bring 
perpetrators of violence to justice turn out to be the major perpetrators of violence in the 
country. What is more, though the involvement of the Civilian JTF in the fight against 
sectarian insurgency has been useful to the counter-insurgency operations of the official 
JTF, the activities of the local vigilante group are fraught with arbitrary killings and 
human rights abuses. Consequently, JTFs operations have increased the frequency and 
scale of extra-judicial killings and human rights abuses against civilians, and this has 
made host communities to resent their counter-insurgency approach, making it difficult 
for security operatives to gather relevant intelligence from local residents for their 
counter-insurgency operations. The article suggests that, as part of their counter-
insurgency strategy, JTFs must strive to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local 
population, and further advised that the effectiveness of such operations should be 
evaluated based on the number of vulnerable citizens they are able to protect from 
violent attacks and human rights abuses. 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 1986, viewed 22 May 2014, from 
http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-
on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights.pdf 
Amnesty International, 2009, ‘Killing at Will: Extrajudicial Executions and other 
Unlawful Killings by Police in Nigeria’, viewed 28 October 2013, from 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/038/2009/en/f09b1c15-
77b4-40aa-a608-b3b01bde0fc5/afr440382009en.pdf 
AFENO SUPER ODOMOVO 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 3 (December 2014) pp. 46-62  ISSN: 2340-9592 
59 
 
Amnesty International, 2011, ‘Nigeria: Unlawful Killings by the Joint Military Task 
Force in Maiduguri must stop’, Amnesty International Joint Public Statement, 
14 July, viewed 26 May 2014, from 
https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR44/013/2011/fr/ae35378a-
f483-49c9-9fb6-19eff2f92942/afr440132011en.pdf 
Amnesty International, 2012, ‘Nigeria: Trapped in the Cycle of Violence’, viewed 28 
October 2013, from 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR44/043/2012/en  
Amnesty International, 2013, ‘Nigeria: Authorities must Investigate Deaths of Boko 
Haram Suspects in Military Custody’, viewed 31 October 2013, from 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/025/2013/en/a41b9f6e-
1cfa-4ea2-a43a-da13a13377b0/afr440252013en.pdf 
Azuatalam, C., 2012, ‘JTF Rebrands to Operation Pulo Shield’, The Nation (Nigeria), 
viewed 20 May 2014, from 
http://www,thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/33515-jtf-rebrands-
to-operation-pulo-shield.html 
BBC News, 2014, ‘Boko Haram Giwa barracks attack: Nigerian army ‘killed 
hundreds’’, viewed 19 May 2014, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-26819965? 
Blair, D.C., n.d., ‘Military Support for Democracy’, Prism, 3 (3), 3-16, viewed 26 May 
2014, from http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/prism3-16_blair1.pdf 
Boele, R., Fabig, H. and Wheeler, D., 2001, ‘Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. 1. A Study 
in Unsustainable Development: The Story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni 
People – Environment, Economy, Relationships: Conflict and Prospects for 
Resolution’, Sustainable Development, (9), 74-86, viewed 20 May 2014, from 
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~lemenestrel/IMG/pdf/boele_al._2001_sd_shell_ni
geria_.pdf 
Campbell, J., 2011, ‘To Battle Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Put down Your Guns’, Foreign 
Affairs, viewed 8 June 2013, from 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68249/john-campbell/to-battle-
nigerias-boko-haram-put-down-your-guns 
Chiluwa, I., 2011, ‘Media Representation of Nigeria’s Joint Military Task Forces in the 
Niger Delta Crisis’, International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 1 
(9), 197-208. 
Courson, E., 2006, ‘Odi Revisited? Oil and State Violence in Odioma, Brass LGA, 
Bayelsa State’, Economies of Violence, Working paper 1, p.3. 
Editorial, 1999, ‘The Odi Nightmare’, The Guardian (Nigeria), 13 December, p.14. 
Forest, J., 2012, Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, JSOU Press, 
Florida. 
Francis, P., LaPin, D. & Rossiasco, P., 2011, Securing Development and Peace in the 
Niger Delta: A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change, Woodrow Wilson 
International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC. 
Hamza, I. & Sawab, I., 2013, ‘’Civilian JTF’ Hunts Boko Haram in Borno’, Daily Trust 
(Nigeria), viewed 25 October 2013, from 
http://www.weeklytrust.com.ng/index.php/top-stories/12952-civilian-jtf-
hunts-boko-haram-in-borno?tmpl  
INSURGENCY, COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 3 (December 2014) pp. 46-62  ISSN: 2340-9592 
60 
 
Human Rights Watch, 1999, ‘Nigeria-Destruction of Odi and Rape in Choba’, viewed 
15 June 2013, from http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/dec/nibg1299.htm  
Human Rights Watch, 2002, ‘Nigeria - Military Revenge in Benue: A Population under 
Attack’, viewed 12 May 2011, from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/nigeria/ 
Human Rights Watch, 2002, ‘The Niger Delta: No Democratic Dividend’, viewed 4 
July 2011, from http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/nigeria3/nigerdelta.pdf 
Kawu, M.I., 2013, ‘Troubling Issues from the Security Crises in Northern Nigeria’, The 
Vanguard (Nigeria), viewed 25 October 2013, from 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/07/troubling-issues-from-the-security-
crises-in-northern-nigeria/  
Lawan, D.A., 2013, ‘State of Emergency: JTF Dumped 3 335 Corpses in Borno 
Hospital – Report’ Sunday Trust (Nigeria), viewed 21 October 2013, from 
http://www.sundaytrust.com.ng/index.php/news/14757-state-of-emergency-
jtf-dumped-3-335-corpses-in-borno-hospital-report?teml  
Malina, T., n,d., Militancy in the Niger Delta, Mathew B. Ridgway Center for 
International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, viewed 
22 May 2014, from 
http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/RidgwayResearch/Issues/InternationalPeaceSe
curity/BackgroundersIPS/tabid/552/smid/1686/ArticleID/646/reftab/497/t/
Militancy-in-the-Niger-Delta/Default.aspx 
Mamah, E., 2013, ‘Human Rights Monitor Raises Alarm over Activities of Civilian 
JTF’, The Vanguard (Nigeria), viewed 12 September 2013, from 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/07/human-rights-monitor-raises-alarm-
over-activities-of-civilian-jtf/   
Mamah, E., Omonobi, K., Marama, N. and Agande, B., 2014, ‘207 Suspected Terrorists 
Killed as Boko Haram Battle Military in Maiduguri’, The Vanguard (Nigeria), 
viewed 21 May 2014, from http://vanguardngr.com/2014/03/207-suspected-
terrorists-killed-boko-haram-battle-military-maiduguri/ 
Melzer, N., 2009, ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law’, International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), viewed 26 May 2014, from 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf 
Mohammed, H.I., 2012, ‘X-raying the Activities of Operation Restore Order in Borno 
State’ 1 Nigerian Defence Magazine, p. 28. 
Monguno, H., 2013, ‘Terrorism, Security and Fifth Columnists’, Leadership (Nigeria), 
29 October 2013, p.34. 
Mutum, R., 2013, ‘Insurgency… military admits 1,400 detained without trial’, Daily 
Trust (Nigeria), viewed 20 May 2014, from 
http://www.dailytrust.info/index.php/top-stoties/11657-i-n-s-u-r-g-e-n-c-y-
military-admits-1-400-detained-without-trail?tmpl 
National Human Rights Commission, 2013, The Baga Incident and the Situation in 
North-East Nigeria, An Interim Assessment and Report, NHRC, Abuja. 
Nigeria Watch Database on Violence, viewed 25 October 2013, from http://ngw-
opsis/index.php?urlaction=evtView&id_evt=11719&rang=15 
AFENO SUPER ODOMOVO 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 3 (December 2014) pp. 46-62  ISSN: 2340-9592 
61 
 
Nwabughiogu, L., 2013, ‘Abuja Killings: The Truth, Lies and Politics’, Vanguard 
(Nigeria), viewed 31 October 2013, from 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/abuja-killings-truth-lies-politics/ 
Olugbode, M., 2013, ‘Civilian JTF: A Brewing Disaster Nipped in the Bud’, Thisday 
(Nigeria), viewed 28 October 2013, from 
http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/civilian-jtf-a-brewing-disaster-nipped-
in-the-bud/162656/ 
Rineheart, J., 2010, ‘Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency’, Perspectives on 
Terrorism, 4(5), viewed 19 May 2014, from 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html 
Stratfor, 2013, ‘Nigeria: Civilian Vigilantes in the Fight against Boko Haram’, viewed 
25 October 2013, from http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/nigeria-
civilian-vigilantes-fight-against-boko-haram 
Stratfor, 2014, ‘Stratfor Report: Military Doctrine, Guerrilla Warfare and Counter-
Insurgency’, viewed 14 March 2014, from 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article4483.html 
United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) News, 2011, 
‘Understanding Nigeria’s Boko Haram Radicals’, viewed 20 June 2013, from 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reported=93250  
United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) News, 2013, ‘Updated 
timeline of Boko Haram attacks and related violence’, viewed 16 December 
2013, from http://www,irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=99319 
United Nations News Centre, 2014, ‘Recent wave of attacks in north-east Nigeria 
‘unprecedented’ – UN refugee agency’’, viewed 17 May 2014, from 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47761#.U3dgiIFdX4w 
United Nations News, 2013, ‘Ban ‘shocked and saddened’ by civilian deaths in Nigeria 
violence’’, viewed 17 May 2014, from 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44722# 
United Nations, 1949, ‘United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948’, 
viewed 27 May 2014, from http://www.supremecourt.ge/files/upload-
file/pdf/act3.pdf 
United Nations, 2006, ‘United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, Resolution 
60/288 adopted by the General Assembly at the 60
th
 Session on 8 September, 
viewed 22 May, from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement 
United Nations, 2008, ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism’, Factsheet 
No.32, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
viewed 24 May 2014, from 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf 
United Nations, 2011, ‘Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism’ at the 66th Session of 
the General Assembly, New York, 20 October, viewed 19 May 2014, from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display/News.aspx?NewsID=1
1736&LangID=E 
 
INSURGENCY, COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 3 (December 2014) pp. 46-62  ISSN: 2340-9592 
62 
 
United Nations, 2013, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism, presented at the 68
th
 Session of the General Assembly, 18 September, 
viewed 19 May  2014, from 
http://justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/2013EmmersonSpecialR
apporteurReportDrones.pdf 
Wisdom, P., 2013, ‘185 Feared Killed in JTF, Boko Haram Clash in Borno’, Daily 
Independent (Nigeria), viewed 9 July 2013, from 
http://www.dailyindependentnig.com/2013/04/185-feared-killed-in-jtf-boko-
haram-clash-in-borno/  
